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STERLING V. TENET

416 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2005)

FACTS

In August 2001, Jeffrey Sterling, an African-American formerly
employed with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), filed a pro se
complaint against the agency in the Southern District of New York alleging
violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 Sterling was an
Operations Officer in the CIA's Near East and South Asia division from
1993 to 2001.2 He alleged that he was the victim of unlawful discriminatory
practices, accusing the agency of demanding expectations of him that far
exceeded those of non African-American Operations Officers, withholding
advantageous opportunities from him, subjecting him to disparate treatment,
assigning him Advanced Work Plans that contained more demanding duties
than those assigned to non African-Americans, retaliating against him for
utilizing the agency's Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) process,
scheduling him to undergo security processing earlier than he should have
been, and vandalizing his personal property.3
The complaint was served on the government in January 2002, but
the trial court later redacted it after the CIA protested that the complaint
contained classified information. 4 The agency sought dismissal of the case
on "state secrets" grounds,5 but the court refused.6 It did, however, grant the
government's motion to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Virginia,
where the CIA is located.7
Upon transfer, the government renewed its claim to the state secrets
privilege. 8 The Director of the CIA filed two declarations, one classified and
the other unclassified, explaining why invocation of the privilege was
necessary to prevent disclosure of classified information. 9 The district court
considered the declarations in an ex parte, in camera examination and
granted the government's motion to dismiss, concluding that state secrets
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Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 341 (2005); see Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964)

(prohibiting employment discrimination).
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Id. at 341-42.
Id. at 341. "The [state secrets] doctrine embodies an evidentiary privilege which protects

military and state secrets from disclosure in judicial proceedings." (citing United States v. Reynolds, 345

U.S. 1, 7 (1953)) (holding that the government had a valid claim to the state secrets privilege because
disclosure of the requested information could jeopardize classified information) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see infra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing "state secrets" and the Court's holding in
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953)).
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"were critical to the resolution of core factual questions in the case," and that
dismissal, therefore, was necessary.' 0
Sterling timely appealed the trial court's dismissal and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit conducted a de novo review of
the ruling." 1
HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that
the CIA properly invoked the state secrets privilege, as articulated in United
States v. Reynolds, 12 and that invocation of the privilege required dismissal
of Sterling's Title VII claims.' 3
ANALYSIS

The Fourth Circuit began by articulating the decisive issues: (1)
when the privilege may be invoked; and (2) when a properly invoked
privilege justifies complete dismissal. 14 Judge Wilkinson, writing for the
court, explained that only the government may invoke the privilege; private
parties have no right to claim or waive it. 15 The government formally claims
the privilege when the head of the agency conducts "actual personal
consideration" and asserts the privilege based on that personal
determination.' 6 It is then for the court to decide whether the circumstances
support invocation of the privilege. ' 7 Additionally, the Fourth Circuit noted
that the trial court must make this determination without jeopardizing the
18
secrecy of the contested materials or issues in the process.

to
Id.
I I d.
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United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).

In Reynolds, the Court considered the

applicability of the military secrets doctrine to suits brought against the United States Air Force under the
Tort Claims Act. Id. at 2. On October 6, 1948, three civilians were killed in the crash of a government
aircraft that was testing secret electronic equipment. Id. at 3. Following the incident, widows of the
deceased civilians filed suit. Id. In preparation for trial, respondent widows sought disclosure of the
official accident investigation report in preparation for their case, but the government denied their
request. Id. The Supreme Court countenanced the government's refusal under the military secrets
privilege, determining that disclosure of the sought-after materials would risk exposure of highly
sensitive information. Id. at 10-11. It held that the government properly invoked the privilege, and thus,
the materials were not subject to disclosure. Id. at 11.
13
Sterling, 416 F.3d at 342.
14
Id. at 343.
15
Id.
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If the trial court determines that any response to a question or
discovery request would have a "deleterious effect on national security," it
may cease its inquiry and accept the government's claim of privilege. 19 The
court explained that the circumstances of each case determine what a court
will need to satisfy itself that the privilege was properly invoked. 20 The
greater the plaintiffs showing of necessity, the further the court will inquire
into the claim of privilege. 2' However, the risk of exposing national secrets
can trump even the worthiest of necessities. 22
The law does not require that the court review in camera all
materials that allegedly contain state secrets.2 3 If circumstances indicate that
examination of classified materials, even in the privacy of a judge's
chambers, would pose too great a risk, the court may deem such inquiry
unwarranted. 24 According to the Fourth Circuit, "the party seeking in camera
review must make some threshold showing that such review is
appropriate. ''25 "Courts are not required to play with fire and chance further
disclosure-inadvertent, mistaken, or even intentional-that
would defeat
26
the very purpose for which the privilege exists. ,
Sterling's main contention on appeal was that the CIA improperly
invoked the state secrets privilege and that the district court erroneously
dismissed his claims.2 7 He further argued that the district court dismissed his
claims without adequately considering whether available protective measures
could guard the secrecy of classified materials in the course of litigation.28
The Fourth Circuit reviewed Sterling's case in light of Title VII case
law, noting that he must prove adverse employment action in order to show
unlawful discrimination. 29 Looking to past precedent, the court determined
19

Id.
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Id.
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Id. "[Niational security concerns are paramount, for even the most compelling necessity

cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at
stake." Id. (quoting Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875)) (concluding that public policy
precludes litigation of lawsuits that would inevitably result in the disclosure of matters that the law deems
to be confidential, and respecting which the law prohibits violation of confidence) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
23

24

Id.
Id. at 344.

22
Id. (quoting United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 570 (1989)) (holding that the party
advocating in camera review in order to determine whether privileged attorney-client communications fall
within the crime-fraud exception must make a threshold showing that such review is appropriate) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
26
Id.
27
Id. at 345.
28
29

Id.

Id. (citing James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 368 F.3d 371, 375 (4th Cir. 2004)) (defining
adverse employment action and positing that adverse employment action is essential to proving Title VII
claims, regardless of the route plaintiff takes to proving his case).
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30
that Sterling could accomplish this by proving either discriminatory intent
3
or disparate treatment. ' Assuming all elements are met, the burden would
shift to the CIA to show a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its
actions, and then return to Sterling
to prove that the CIA's explanation was a
"pretext for discrimination.' 3 2

The court explained that the state secrets privilege could go forward
only if the CIA had properly invoked it. 33 For this to happen, the one who
has control over the matter, the CIA Director in this case, must personally
consider the matter before lodging a formal claim of privilege.34 After
invoking the privilege, he must articulate his reasons for so doing.35
According to the Director of the CIA, he had complied with proper protocol,
having claimed the privilege after personally considering the situation and
also having set forth reasons supporting it.36 He explained that Sterling
could not make a prima facie case of discrimination without
"compromis[ing] CIA sources and methods, threaten[ing] the safety of
intelligence sources, and adversely affect[ing] foreign relations. 37
Persuaded by the facts, the court found that this information was
foundational to Sterling's case and concluded that disparate treatment could
not be proved without disclosing the names, positions, and duties of other
Operations Officers and supervisors.38 Neither could Sterling make a case
for discriminatory intent without bringing confidential information to light.39
The Fourth Circuit postulated that even if Sterling could convince
the court that he could make a case for employment discrimination without
revealing state secrets, the government's rebuttal case inevitably must
reference the protected material.4n
The CIA would have to furnish
nondiscriminatory reasons for its treatment of Sterling and would be
compelled to explain why Sterling received different tasks and operational
tools than similarly situated peers. 4 1 "The evidence required would
42
inescapably reveal the criteria inherent in sensitive CIA decisionmaking.
Furthermore, the court determined that the very methods employed for
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Id.
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Id.
Id. (citing Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7-8) (articulating the protocol for invoking the state secrets
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privilege).
35
Id.
36
Id.
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Id. at

346.
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Id.

39

See id. at 347 (describing Sterling's attempt to establish the elements of a Title VII claim

without disclosing state secrets as an "impossible feat").
40 Id.
41
Id.
42

Id. (emphasis added).
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gathering evidence would jeopardize privacy.43 Disclosure of information
deemed inconsequential by uninformed minds could lead to disastrous results
if leaked. 44
Sterling's final argument was that dismissal of all his claims was in
error, even if the state secrets privilege applied. a The Fourth Circuit
disagreed, reasoning that dismissal was inevitable because the "sum and
substance" of the case concerned state secrets. 46 According to the court,
"when the very subject of the litigation is itself a state secret, which provides
no way [that] case could be tried without compromising sensitive military
secrets, a district court may properly dismiss the plaintiff s case., 47 It added
that dismissal is appropriate only when no efforts of the court or parties can
produce adequate protection for the privileged material.48 Nevertheless, it
determined that all efforts to devise adequate protective measures in
Sterling's case still would fall short of guaranteeing complete secrecy. 49
Although the court rejected Sterling's claim, it did note that other
avenues of recourse were available to him. 50 For example, Sterling and those
in similar circumstances, could utilize the CIA's EEO process to resolve his
disputes. 51 However, the court did caution that the availability of alternative
internal or administrative processes5 2had no bearing on the validity of the
agency's invocation of the privilege.
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit held that the state secrets privilege
was properly invoked by the CIA Director and that Sterling's claims were
rightly dismissed.5 3 The court need not inquire further, having satisfied itself

43

Id.

Id. " [W]hat may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who has a
broad view of the scene and may put the questioned item of information in its proper context." Id.
(quoting CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 170 (1985)) (finding that it was clear from the National Security Act
of 1947 that "Congress intended to give the Director of the CIA broad power to protect the secrecy and
integrity of the intelligence process") (internal quotation marks omitted).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 347-48 (quoting Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1243 (4th Cir.
1985)) (concluding that the district court did not err in dismissing petitioner's case because the substance
of the litigation comprised state secrets and petitioner's case could not be tried without compromising
those secrets) (internal quotation marks omitted).
48
Id. at 348.
49
Id. "Such procedures, whatever they might be, still entail considerable risk. Inadvertent
disclosure during the course of a trial-or even in camera-is precisely the sort of risk that Reynolds
attempts to avoid. At best, special accommodations give rise to added opportunity for leaked information.
At worst, the information would become public, placing covert agents and intelligence sources alike at
grave personal risk." Id. (emphasis added).
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 348-49.
44

344

12WAsH. & LEE J. C.R. & Soc. JUST. 2 (2006)

that resolution of petitioner's claims would lead to inadvertent disclosure of
state secrets.54
CONCLUSION

Although the Fourth Circuit did not expressly state that Title VII
plaintiffs are without legal recourse should they bring an action against the
CIA, the effect of its decision is to place relief beyond the grasp of most
parties when the agency claims the state secrets privilege.
Certainly, there are important policy reasons behind the privilege.
The government has a vital interest in preserving national security. In
today's post-September 11 world, protection against terrorism is a high
priority in the United States and abroad. Therefore, the government has a
keen interest in preserving the confidentiality of its strategies, methods,
informants, and operatives. However, these policy reasons, as important as
they are, should not eclipse the government's duty to safeguard employee
rights against discrimination. Any tendency to erode these rights must be
checked.
Here, the Fourth Circuit dismissed Sterling's claim upon a cursory
review of the case. It urged that "dismissal is appropriate [o]nly when no
amount of effort and care on the part of the court and the parties will
safeguard privileged material, 5 5 but the careful consideration of available
protective measures that would follow from such a statement was absent.
The effect of the decision may be to minimize government accountability
and leave vulnerable employee rights against discrimination. Once the
government mounts the privilege, it may enjoy a near complete insulation
from suit. The Title VII claimant may be denied his day in court.
The Fourth Circuit's opinion was also surprisingly abstract. Unlike
most state secrets cases, which typically are ruled on specific discovery
requests, the holding here was an outright, plenary dismissal. No concrete
discovery requests or access to particularized information were at issue.56
Instead, the court appeared to assume on an abstract basis that Sterling could
not make his case without exposing state secrets.
It is important to note that there are varying degrees of classified
material. One document may not be as sensitive as the next, and not
everything that is classified is so sensitive that it cannot withstand in camera
54

Id.

Id. at 348 (quoting Fitzgerald, 776 F.2d at 1244); see supra note 47 and accompanying text
(noting that a court may dismiss a case where it cannot be litigated without divulging state secrets).
55

56

See id. (stating "Sterling's argument that the court could devise special procedures that would

allow his suit to proceed must . . . fail.
considerable risk.") (emphasis added).

Such procedures, whatever they might be, still entail
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review or safe-keeping by protective measures. However, this notion was
strangely absent from the Fourth Circuit's analysis. The court should have
inquired into the level of secrecy that various materials required and
considered whether appropriate protective measures could be devised to
allow at least partial admission. Materials that required the utmost secrecy
would be omitted, while materials requiring less secrecy would be guarded
through appropriate safeguards. It was not clear from the opinion, however,
whether the court even knew the nature of the state secrets and whether the
secrets were as sensitive as the court considered them to be.
Had the court found that certain of the classified information could
have been protected from disclosure through appropriate means, it could
have recommended a number of safeguards. Protective measures might have
included in camera review or a bench trial rather than a jury trial. This
would have required Sterling to forego his right to trial by jury, but such a
choice should have been his to make. Other alternative options include
holding depositions could be held at CIA headquarters, with transcripts taken
and maintained by CIA personnel, or the use of pseudonyms in court
documents and opinions to protect the identity of operatives and other
personnel. Conceivably, several other options were available to the court
had it made greater efforts to explore reasonable measures to protect the
government's interests while allowing Sterling to litigate his claims.
The court noted that the CIA's EEO process was available to
Sterling as an alternative for resolving his disputes.57 This provides little
consolation to Sterling, however, because his retaliation claim was based
upon his prior use of the EEO process.5 8 Specifically, Sterling claimed that
CIA management had acted against him for utilizing this very avenue. 59 If
the CIA had retaliated against Sterling for using its internal procedures, the
likelihood that he would obtain a more favorable result on the second attempt
is questionable.
The Fourth Circuit's decision poses grave implications beyond Title
VII discrimination claims. Conceivably, CIA employees may suffer any
number of injustices, including curtailment of constitutional rights such as
freedom of speech and religion, yet be without legal recourse. Personal
rights enshrined in the Constitution could be sacrificed to the state secrets
privilege, and claimants deprived of their day in court. In light of the
important personal liberty and national security interests at stake, there
should be special efforts to develop provisions that will allow claimants to

57
58

59

Id.

See id. (admitting that Sterling had already utilized the CiA's EEO process).
Id. at 341.

346
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litigate their cases against the nation's intelligence agencies, while guarding
national security in the process.
Summary and Analysis Prepared By:
Andrea Oliver

